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Two Propositions About Biodiversity
Clifford S. Russell
ABSTRACT

In his opening statement, Professor Russell gives two
reasons why humankind should worry about the diversity of
life on eartk (1) diversity is thought to make ecological
systems more resilient to naturaland man-made shocks; and
(2) diversity provides a library of genetic information upon
which society may draw. Professor Russell nevertheless
warns against the notion that a 'safety-first" or safe
minimum standardapproachto environmentalpreservation is
the correct response to these concerns. First, 'safety" is
impossible to define. And, second, preserving all systems at
all costs demands that society forego significant current
economic rewards that result from altering some ecological
systems.
Some judgments are necessary about specific
preservation versus development alternatives, even though
society will inevitably make such decisions in a condition of
ignoranceabout both the future costs and the exact amount of
the current gains. Professor Russell concludes by offering
two suggestions on how preservation can be made to work
better. First, species should be preserved indirectly by
protecting the environment in which they exist. Second, local
human populations should be given economic incentives to
participatein the preservationefforts.

What is biodiversity? In qualitative terms, biodiversity refers
to the variety of life on earth. What constitutes biodiversity,
however, is not the focus of this Article, which instead states two
propositions, each of which has a couple of subpropositions.
First, in the material that sets out the agenda for this
Symposium, the word "crisis" appears fairly regularly; the
"biodiversity crisis" is referred to as a fact. Whether it is a fact, or
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whether the word "crisis" is simply used, as it regularly is in our
society, to denote anything to which society wants to call
attention, there are at least two good reasons for worrying about
the variety of life on earth.
The first reason society should be concerned about
biodiversity is that more diverse systems are thought to be more
resilient to nasty shocks--whether those are natural, as in fire,
flood, freeze, or insects; or human, as in roads, timber cutting, or

pesticide application. The Irish potato famine of the middle 19th
century is an example of the dangers of a very nondiverse system.
One pest, the cause of the Irish potato famine-which is making a
comeback according to a recent Wall Street Journal articlel--was
able almost to prostrate the human system it attacked, because
that system depended so heavily on a single crop. Admittedly, the
devastated system was not natural, as a rain forest would be.
But even though it was the human element that was so
vulnerable, it is the general notion of vulnerability that people
worry about when they talk about diversity as a support for
resilience-the ability to bounce back from adversity.
The hypothesis that diverse systems are more resilient (an
ecological theorem of sorts) has not been proven true in any
sense. That is, the diversity-equals-resilience hypothesis has not
been tested in the way hypotheses are testable and tested in the
laboratory sciences. It does, however, appear to be one that most
ecologists would accept without argument or with very little
argument. It may be a relationship that changes over the extent
of biodiversity. But the conservative choice in society's current
state of ignorance may well be to bet that the relationship exists,
because the consequences of losing a bet against it are potentially
catastrophic.
The second broad reason for worrying about biodiversity, one
that is increasingly popular, is simply that losing species means
losing genetic information-the templates for proteins that might
turn out to be useful to humans at some time in the future.
There is no scarcity of anecdotes to illustrate this concern. We
are always discovering new plants that have beneficial uses. The
popular (wishful) version of this anecdotal knowledge is: "Well,
what if plant X contains a compound that is a cure for cancer,
and we destroy it? We will have created an incalculable loss."
Here the word "incalculable," which also is found in the
introductory material for the Symposium, ought to be read to
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convey as much about our ignorance, which is almost total, as it
does about the vast but uncertain rewards for preservation. We
simply do not know what is out there. So we cannot know what
we are losing. And, as Ready and Bishop have shown, it matters
2
for current decisionmaking when we expect to find out more.
Intuitively, however, this second argument from ignorance
also leads toward a safety-first approach 3 to biodiversity. Even
so, safety-first, or a "safe minimum standard," 4 cannot be taken
as a magic spell or potion that puts the problem to rest. There
are two reasons why the safety-first proposition should be viewed
with caution. First, because no one knows how many species
there are, what they do for a living, or how they function
collectively as ecosystems, no one really can know what "safety"
means. For example, assume that society aims to preserve all of
whatever may be in a particular variety of tropical rain forest.
That is, while we do not know what species exist in the forest, we
would like to preserve them. And preserving the forest as a
system seems the obvious way to achieve that. But, and this is
where the policy rubber meets the political road, we do not know
how much of that rain forest must be preserved in order to
preserve "the system." Why is that important? Why not just
preserve it all? The problem is practical, political and, in a
narrower sense, economic. Efforts to preserve entire systems, for
example, can adversely affect the people who live in or on the
edges of these systems and who are trying to develop in one way
or another, or are just trying to survive. The greater the efforts to
preserve, the more conflict the efforts generate. Choices must be

made, and the safety-first slogan does not help to make them.
The second reason to claim that safety-first is not the magic
bullet is that intuition is not a perfect guide to making policy
As previously alluded to, the
decisions in this area.
environmental economics literature shows that safety-first is not
the conservative strategy in every context. Under some assumed
situations-in effect, where we cannot know now or later what we
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3.
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4.
catastrophe.
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currently may be destroying-it can be conservative to opt for
shorter term rewards.
As a supplement to the previous arguments for taking
biodiversity seriously--and the caution about the safety-first
prescription-the following two notions are worth considering.
First, it does not make a lot of sense to try to preserve species as
species. It makes much more sense to preserve systems as
systems and thus to preserve the species in them by indirection.
There are some cases in which the species are so visible and so
important-wolves, grizzly bears, and so forth-that we really
cannot play the game quite that way. We are forced politically to
concentrate on the species. For example, the spotted owl came to
dominate discussion when the real issue was about old growth
forest ecosystems. It was a useful symbol for each side in the
political war, but the focus on owl survival distorted the
discussion of how much and which parts of the old-growth forests
to preserve.
Second, if one wants to preserve an ecological system, the
best way to do so is to give individuals or small groups on the
ground, in or around the systems, some kind of incentive to do
the preserving. The agreements that have been worked out
between developing countries and pharmaceutical firms relating
to species "prospecting" and to future drug discoveries are
examples of attempts to work out such incentives and thus to
encourage a country to take on preservation, even when that may
go against the short term interests of some of its citizens. Under
such agreements a country, or possibly a preservation agency
within a country, has an incentive to try to preserve species in
systems, where prospecting can go on for useful compounds. On
a more pedestrian level, there are agreements in Zimbabwe that
give part of the tourist profits related to wilderness areas to the
tribal groups that surround the areas. Such contracts give these
groups an incentive not to become part of the poaching problem
but to become part of the policing action-the anti-poaching
solution. It appears that the smaller the group and the closer the
group to the system to be preserved, the better. Countries-or
rather government bureaucracies--are
notoriously bad at
managing preservation efforts. But, if locals are involved, the
chances of success are greatly increased.
Thus, biodiversity may seem to be an exotic policy context,
involving complex arguments about DNA similarities, how
ecological systems function, and how new drugs are discovered
and marketed. But, because we are ignorant of all the relevant
facts, preservation decisions must be made on grounds that often
seem little better than clich6 and anecdote. Moreover, it is often
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the citizens of the developed world who are trying to make those
decisions, without any good idea how to implement them in the
other countries and other cultures in which the resources are
actually to be found. In the end, the solution may be to rely on
seemingly mundane arrangements aimed at influencing decidedly
nonexotic behavior on the part of "the locals."

